Virtue Theoretic Epistemology
-10%
portes grátis
Virtue Theoretic Epistemology
New Methods and Approaches
Kelp, Christoph; Greco, John
Cambridge University Press
11/2022
270
Mole
Inglês
9781108740463
15 a 20 dias
Descrição não disponível.
Introduction. Virtue theoretic epistemology Christoph Kelp; 1. Closed-mindedness as an intellectual vice Heather Battaly; 2. Epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content Cameron Boult, Christoph Kelp, Johanna Schnurr and Mona Simion; 3. Difficulty and knowledge Fernando Broncano-Berrocal; 4. What is epistemic entitlement? Reliable competence, reasons, inference, access Peter Graham; 5. Knowledge-producing abilities John Greco; 6. Virtue epistemology, two kinds of internalism, and the intelligibility problem Jonathan Kvanvig; 7. Knowledge is extrinsically apt belief: virtue epistemology and the temporal objection Anne Meylan; 8. Explaining knowledge Alan Millar; 9. Anti-risk virtue epistemology Duncan Pritchard; 10. Responsibilism within reason Kurt Sylvan.
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virtue theory; virtue ethics; virtue epistemology; virtue reliabilism; virtue responsibilism; epistemic virtue; knowledge; normativity
Introduction. Virtue theoretic epistemology Christoph Kelp; 1. Closed-mindedness as an intellectual vice Heather Battaly; 2. Epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content Cameron Boult, Christoph Kelp, Johanna Schnurr and Mona Simion; 3. Difficulty and knowledge Fernando Broncano-Berrocal; 4. What is epistemic entitlement? Reliable competence, reasons, inference, access Peter Graham; 5. Knowledge-producing abilities John Greco; 6. Virtue epistemology, two kinds of internalism, and the intelligibility problem Jonathan Kvanvig; 7. Knowledge is extrinsically apt belief: virtue epistemology and the temporal objection Anne Meylan; 8. Explaining knowledge Alan Millar; 9. Anti-risk virtue epistemology Duncan Pritchard; 10. Responsibilism within reason Kurt Sylvan.
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
